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OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING, ABORIGINAL COST,
AND POOLING OF INTERESTS
ACCOUNTING
Abstract: Through the years, pooling of interest accounting was
criticized as contrary to the decision usefulness objective of financial
reporting and potentially misleading to stockholders and creditors,
the assumed principal users of financial reports. This paper does not
dispute those criticisms. It demonstrates, however, that there were
some very good reasons for permitting pooling accounting for certain
business combinations when the method was developed in the 1940s.
At that time, the basic objectives of financial accounting encompassed
stewardship and decision usefulness for multiple users, including
public utility regulators and public policy makers. Pooling account
ing developed in part to satisfy the information needs of public utility
regulators who favored aboriginal (original historical) cost to deter
mine the utility rate base; additionally, it was favored by public policy
makers who sought lower utility rates (prices) to foster social and
economic goals.

INTRODUCTION
Most academic and practicing accountants are familiar
with the recent theory controversy over the financial report
ing of business combinations. A major part of this controversy
centered on whether to continue to require or permit pooling of
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interests accounting under Accounting Principles Board [APB]
Opinion No. 16, “Business Combinations” [APB 16, 1970] for
business combinations brought about by exchanges of common
stock. Pooling accounting was criticized as contrary to more
basic accounting concepts [see, e.g., Wyatt, 1963, pp. 92-95,
105; Kam 1990, p. 379] and/or potentially misleading to external
financial report users such as stockholders and creditors [see,
e.g., Seligman, 1982, p. 420] and/or contrary to the stewardship
and/or decision usefulness objectives of financial reporting [see,
e.g., Martinez-Jerez, 2008, p. 6]. Among other defects, critics of
pooling accounting [see, e.g., Briloff, 1967, pp. 490-495; Lintner,
1971, pp. 106-107; and Davis, 1990, p. 104] noted that it grossly
understated (1) the cost of such combinations; (2) the carrying
values of acquiree net assets at the combination date; and (3)
the expenses from using up those net assets subsequent to the
combination date.1 The controversy was largely resolved in the
United States by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 141, “Business Combinations” [SFAS-141, 2001],2 and in
ternationally by International Financial Reporting Standard No.
3, “Business Combinations” [IFRS-3, 2004], which prohibited
pooling accounting and required purchase accounting for all
business combinations.3 For convenience, the subsequent dis
cussion of accounting standards is in terms of U.S. GAAP.
This paper does not dispute these aforementioned criti
cisms of pooling accounting. Rather, it demonstrates that, from
a historical perspective, there were some very good reasons for
requiring or at least permitting pooling accounting for stock-forstock combinations of public utility companies when the meth
od was developed in the 1940s. At that time, the basic objectives
of financial accounting were viewed more broadly than now to
1Of course, corporate management of unregulated industries and their pro
moters often favored pooling accounting for these very reasons; it usually report
ed stock-for-stock combinations at lower book values rather than at higher fair
values, thereby resulting in reporting lower expenses and higher earnings after
the combination.
2Somewhat inconsistently, shortly after prohibiting pooling accounting for
business combinations, the FASB prescribed a similar accounting method for
certain combinations of not-for-profit organizations. However, the FASB refers
to this prescribed accounting method as the carryover method, not the pooling
method. See SFAS 164, 2009, paras. 6-7, in ASC Section 956-810-20.
3To harmonize terminology internationally and reflect some more recent
changes in the way combinations are recorded, purchase accounting is now called
the acquisition method. See Financial Accounting Standards Statement No. 141
(Revised), “Business Combinations” [SFAS 141(R), 2007a], in FASB Accounting
Standards Codification (ASC) Section 805.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
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include providing information to a set of unknown users with
multiple needs, not just stockholders and creditors; importantly,
the basic objectives of financial accounting included providing
information for rate making by utility regulators and for foster
ing certain social and economic goals by public policy makers.
In the 1940s, some of the above enumerated defects of pooling
accounting were viewed as strengths, at least by utility regula
tors and public policy makers.
More specifically, because it reported stock-for-stock com
binations at historical cost book values rather than at usually
higher fair values, pooling accounting conformed to the concept
of aboriginal (or original historical) cost and prudent invest
ment theory in utility regulation. As a result, it usually resulted
in lower utility rate bases; in turn, the lower rate bases resulted
in lower utility rates (prices), which were viewed as consis
tent with social and economic policies of encouraging more
widespread use of electricity to facilitate economic growth and
enhance living standards of the masses. The remainder of this
paper is organized in the following sections:
(a) Overview of tax and financial accounting for stockfor-stock combinations
(b) Rate making information needs of regulatory authori
ties
(c) Rationale of aboriginal cost for regulatory purposes
(d) Rationale of pooling accounting for regulatory pur
poses
(e) Changing perceptions of objectives of financial report
ing
(f) Summary and conclusion
(g) Addendum: Recent combinations of health care orga
nizations
OVERVIEW OF TAX AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR
STOCK-FOR-STOCK BUSINESS COMBINATIONS
Section 368 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (IRC) deals
with business combinations, which it refers to as corporate
reorganizations. Turnier [1976, p. 911] notes that since 1918,
the IRC provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on stock or
securities received incident to nontaxable corporate reorganiza
tions; since 1924, the IRC provides for carryover basis, whereby
the tax basis of the old stock or securities becomes the tax basis
of the new stock or securities in nontaxable corporate reorgani
Published by eGrove, 2012
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zations.4 Section 368 includes detailed tests as to what qualifies
as a nontaxable corporate reorganization. Under Section 368,
many if not most stock-for-stock business combinations are
nontaxable corporate reorganizations, with the acquirees tax
basis of the stock or net identifiable assets carried over to the
acquirer.
Until the 1940s, all business combinations, including non
taxable stock-for-stock business combinations, were subject
to purchase accounting for financial reporting purposes. As a
result, the acquirer reported the identifiable net assets of the
acquiree at fair value for financial reporting purposes, with the
residual reported as goodwill.5 On the other hand, nontaxable
stock-for-stock business combinations were subject to carryover
basis for tax purposes. Sapienza [1962, pp. 277-278] suggests
that pooling accounting is merely an adaption of the tax treat
ment of nontaxable business combinations for financial report
ing purposes:
If a combination is accounted for tax-wise in one man
ner, namely [with carryover basis] as [a] pooling, and as
a purchase in financial reports, pressure to create an ac
counting method to conform to the tax law arises. The
concept of pooling is the natural outgrowth.... It is the
authors [Sapienza's] view that the pooling concept in
accounting ... results, in part, from tax law. The pooling
4Turnier [1976, p. 911] suggests that Congress granted nonrecognition of gain
or loss for qualifying reorganizations principally from "... a desire not to discour
age economic restructurings which otherwise would have occurred in the course
of the orderly evolution of the nation’s economy.” He [1976, p. 911] notes that
from 1921 to 1924, the Code inadvertently permitted basis step up even though it
permitted nonrecognition of gain or loss.
5 Until 1953, acquirers could write off goodwill immediately against addition
al paid-in capital for financial reporting purposes. Additionally, until 1953, some
acquirers reported some or all of the difference between the book value and the
fair value of the acquiree as goodwill when it was impracticable to allocate that
difference to individual identifiable tangible and intangible net assets, with just
the residual reported as goodwill. See Wyatt, 1963, pp. 30, 38-39. (However, this
practice was presumably more common for unregulated than for regulated com
panies, because regulated companies made every effort to allocate the difference
in order to obtain a stepped up rate base.) Until 1970, acquirers could choose not
to amortize unimpaired goodwill. See APB 17, 1970, para. 14. As a result, post
combination net income might be almost the same under purchase and pooling
accounting. (Again, however, this result was more common for unregulated than
for regulated companies.) Until 2001, some acquirers reported some or all of the
difference between the book values and the fair values of acquiree identifiable
intangible assets as goodwill rather than allocated those differences to individu
al identifiable intangible assets, with just the residual reported as goodwill. See
SFAS 141, 2001, para. B162-B164.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4

4

Nurnberg: Objectives of financial reporting, aboriginal cost, and pooling of interests accounting

Nurnberg, Pooling

49

concept allows parallel treatment in tax and financial
reports, in accounting for business combinations.
The next section of this paper discusses the rate making
information needs of public utility regulatory authorities. The
heart of the paper is the following two sections that discuss,
respectively, the rationale of aboriginal cost for utility regulatory
purposes, and how pooling accounting developed as a logical
outgrowth of the increasing use of aboriginal cost for regulatory
purposes. The next section considers the changing perceptions
of the objectives of financial reporting, followed by a summary
and conclusion section. An addendum discusses how pooling
accounting might enter into the debate as to the reasonableness
of third-party reimbursement rates following combinations of
health care organizations.
RATE MAKING INFORMATION NEEDS OF REGULATORY
AUTHORITIES6
Rowe and Anderson [1993, p. 7] note that in the late
nineteenth century, state legislatures across the United States
imposed regulation over the then rapidly developing electric
utility industry. State legislatures understood that a utility was a
natural monopoly—i.e., because of economies of scale, the cost
of service is lower with a single provider than with several utility
companies competing with one another.7 Rowe and Anderson
[1993, p. 7] refer to a “regulatory compact” that state legisla
6Some public utilities are subject only to state regulation, others only to
federal regulation, and still others to state and federal regulation. As a result,
there have been numerous rate making decisions by state and federal regulatory
authorities since the 1880s. Many of these decisions were subsequently argued
before state or federal courts; and many decisions of regulatory authorities and
lower level state and federal courts were supported or overturned by higher level
courts and ultimately by the U.S. Supreme Court. An extensive literature summa
rizes these cases. See, e.g., Baur, 1944; Carpenter, 1950; Joslin and Miller, 1957;
Hearth et al., 1988. This paper emphasizes the decisions of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), formerly the Federal Power Commission (FPC),
and the U.S. Supreme Court.
7At least since the 1970s if not before, some of these natural monopoly posi
tions were lessened due to changing technology and economics. For example,
presently two or more electric utility companies may compete to provide electric
power over the same transmission lines, and interstate trucking competes more
effectively with railroads than heretofore. As a result, regulators and legislators
saw a reduced need to protect the public from the potential abuse of the mo
nopoly positions of utilities, and the extent of regulation has been reduced. For
example, the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 reduced the extent of federal regulation of railroads.
Published by eGrove, 2012
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tures established to impose responsibilities on both the utilities
and the state:
Utilities were obliged to provide universal, adequate
service and submit themselves to rate and service regu
lation so customers would be protected from the abuses
of monopoly power (high prices and poor service).
States agreed to afford companies an opportunity to
earn a reasonable return on prudent investments. Regu
lation was imposed as a substitute for competition.
Federal regulation of natural monopolies started at about
the same time. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887 established the Interstate Commerce Commission to regu
late railroads. Other natural monopolies ultimately subject to
state and/or federal regulation include natural gas, water, street
cars, bus lines, trucking, and airlines.
Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1035-1036] note that the basic
theory of regulation focuses on setting utility rates at a level
sufficient to give the utility a “reasonable" rate of return on its
investment. If the rate is set too low, it is deemed to be “con
fiscatory,” to involve a “taking of private property for public
use without just compensation,” and is a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Leventhal [1965,
p. 995] adds that as a result of the 1944 Hope Natural Gas case,8
another concern of utility regulation is making sure that the rate
of return is sufficient for a utility to accumulate and attract the
capital needed for the maintenance and growth of productive as
sets to satisfy the publics demand for service.9 Bernstein [1937,
p. 129] elaborates that rate making “...should also be sufficiently
responsive to changing economic conditions to prevent an un
desirable divergence of utility rates from the costs of producing
utility services.”
Rate setting involves fixing the selling price of the services
provided by the utility, which directly affects the amount of rev
enues, and determining the allowable expenses to be deducted
8Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944). See also 320 U.S. 591; 64 S. Ct. 281; 88 L. Ed. 333; 1944 U.S. Lexis 1204.
9 Interestingly, Leventhal [1965, p. 995] notes that as a result of the Hope
case, "... the leading cases suggest that the primary legal standard offered by the
[U.S. Supreme] Court is the standard of comparable earnings. This standard, too,
aims at attracting and holding capital, but it alone permits direct examination of
the ratio between the earnings of a utility and its net worth in comparison with
that ratio in companies of similar risk.” However, the measurement of net worth
remains controversial, with different regulatory authorities favoring aboriginal
cost, prudent investment, and fair value. See also Sparrow, 1965, p. B329.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
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from revenues to derive the income or return. Rate making
requires guidelines to measure the income or return, which is
the numerator, and the investment or rate base, which is the de
nominator, and then ascertaining whether the resulting rate of
return on investment is reasonable.10
According to Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048], public utili
ties traditionally argue that ownership of property includes the
right to earn a return on it; that this return, since it is regulated
by the state, has to be a “fair” return on the “fair value” of the
property; and that unless a utility is afforded the opportunity
to earn a fair rate of return on the fair value of the property, the
property is being confiscated without due process, comparable
to the state appropriating physical assets without payment of
just compensation.
In Smyth v. Ames (1898), the U.S. Supreme Court pre
scribed use of fair value of utility property to measure the rate
base.11 Requiring use of fair value to measure the rate base was
reaffirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in several subsequent
cases until the early 1940s. For example, in the 1923 Southwest
ern Bell Telephone Company case,12 the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed a state supreme courts order and held that the rate
base should reflect the [fair] value of the property at the time the
rates were set, not the original cost, thereby reaffirming Smyth
v. Ames; because the property had increased in value, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that Southwestern Bell was entitled
to rates that reflected the benefit of the increase.
Initially, the fair value of the property was estimated as the
present value of the estimated fair return on the property. Joslin
and Miller [1957, pp. 1048-1049, fn. 62] and others note the cir
10This paper is concerned principally with showing how pooling accounting
evolved as a way to facilitate the increasing use of aboriginal cost valuations of
the rate base—i.e., the denominator of the rate of return calculation. Of course,
the valuation of utility assets in the rate base at aboriginal cost rather than at fair
value subsequently affects the measurement of depreciation expense and income
(return)—i.e., the numerator—of the rate of return calculation. This paper em
phasizes the measurement of the denominator—the rate base—not the income
numerator.
11Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47, modified on rehearing, 171 U.S. 361
(1898), as cited by Joslin and Miller, 1957, p. 1030, fn. 11. “The basis of all calcula
tions as to the reasonableness of rates ... must be the fair value of property being
used by it [the utility] for the convenience of the public.”
12See State of Missouri Ex Rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Pub
lic Service Commission of Missouri, Et Al., No. 158., Supreme Court of the United
States, 262 U.S. 276; 43 S. Ct. 544; 67 L. Ed. 981; 1923 U.S. Lexis 2642; 31 A.L.R.
807.
Published by eGrove, 2012
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cularity inherent in arguing that a utility has the right to earn a
fair rate of return on the fair value of its property measured this
way, because the fair value of property reflects the earnings that
can be obtained from its use. Utilities overcame this circular
ity by using estimated reproduction cost of existing property to
approximate its fair value. However, Smith [1946, p. 295] notes
that estimated reproduction cost of existing property is a poor
measure of its fair value because most existing utility property
would not be replaced with the same property due to technologi
cal improvements; rather, it would be replaced, usually at lower
cost, with more efficient property. Additionally, the process of
estimating reproduction cost was extremely expensive and time
consuming, as was the process of arguing before regulatory
authorities and courts as to the reasonableness of estimates of
reproduction cost to measure the rate base.13
More important, in the Hope Natural Gas Case,14 the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals
and held that the Federal Power Commission (FPC) is permit
ted [but not required] to use historical cost to measure the rate
base.15 However, Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048] note that "...
rate base/rate of return is still the dominant concept in rate reg
ulation.... Rate making is still, despite the end-result language in
Hope, a ‘fair return' on a rate base.”
Therefore, the issue comes down to the valuation of utility
property in the rate base. Traditionally, utilities seeking higher
13See Smith [1946, p. 295], Smith [1946, p. 295] notes that “... probably 300
man-years were required by the company and the Wisconsin Commission to
make a [reproduction cost] valuation of the Wisconsin Telephone Company. The
Ohio Bell Telephone Company case was in process fourteen years, the New York
Telephone case a like period of time, and the Illinois Bell Telephone case twelve
years. He [1946, p. 295] describes this attempt to determine fair value by using
reproduction cost of existing property as "... probably the greatest hoax ever per
petrated on the American consuming public.” Earlier, Healy [1938, p. 6] criticized
reproduction cost for similar reasons: “When one realizes the complexities and
antipathies which reproduction appraisals have engendered in the field of rate
regulation, one regrets its use in balance sheets. It is based on a misapplication
of the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. Its principal products will be confusion and
deception.”
14Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944). See also 320 U.S. 591; 64 S. Ct. 281; 88 L. Ed. 333; 1944 U.S. Lexis 1204.
See also Joslin and Miller [1957, p. 1048].
15As a result of the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, various
energy-related federal agencies were consolidated into a newly-formed Depart
ment of Energy (DOE). The FPC (FPC) was retained as a separate independent
regulatory body within the DOE; however, it was renamed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
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rates favor valuation at fair value whenever it is higher than
aboriginal cost, with fair value estimated as present value of
estimated earnings, or as estimated reproduction cost of existing
property. On the other hand, consumer advocates seeking lower
rates traditionally favor valuation at aboriginal cost, which is
usually lower than fair value.16
In addition, when reviewing a request to recover an invest
ment in utility assets through inclusion in the rate base, regula
tors traditionally rely on two tests: (1) the prudent investment
test, and (2) the used and useful test. According to Hearth et al.
[1988, pp. 16-17], under the prudent investment test, if regula
tors conclude that a utility made an imprudent investment in
utility assets based on then available information, some or all of
that investment may not be recoverable by inclusion in the rate
base.17 The used and useful test asks whether the investment will
16Brundage [1950, p. 388] notes a reversal of positions in the fair value versus
aboriginal cost debate to measure the rate base: “[T]he relatively high initial cost
of the transcontinental railroads and the decline in the general price level during
the last quarter of the nineteenth century led the shippers [as consumers] and the
regulatory commissions during that period to take the position that the railroads
[and other utilities] were not entitled to a fair return on original cost but only on
the then present [fair] value of the property....The Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames
upheld this view in 1898. Since the turn of the [twentieth] century, however, the
price trend has been upward and the commissions, changing their position, have
tried to hold the utilities down to actual cost. At the same time the railroads natu
rally switched their position and insisted on the higher replacement values [or
fair] values. The Supreme Court continued to hold to its position in Smyth v. Ames
[until 1944]....” See also Home [1942, p. 252].
17Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] add that by satisfying the prudent investment test,
a utility can usually recover some or all of the sunk costs of a canceled plant but
not necessarily a return on that sunk cost. They [1988, p. 17] cite the New England
Power Company case, which was upheld by the federal courts, where the Fed
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) ruled that investors and ratepayers
jointly share the risks and potential benefits from constructing new plants, hence
should share in the costs of plant that is canceled before completion; however,
the utility should not earn a return on that sunk cost, even if the utility acted
prudently. See New England Power Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com
mission, 668 F. 2nd 1327 (1981).
On the other hand, in several states, utilities were denied any recovery of sunk
costs of cancelled plants. For example, Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that the
Ohio Supreme Court overturned an Ohio Public Utilities Commission ruling that
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company was entitled to recover the sunk costs of
three cancelled nuclear power plants. The Ohio commission reached its decision
by applying both the prudent investment test and the used and useful test, and also
argued that its decision was consistent with the vast majority of decisions in other
jurisdictions. However, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and held
that, under Ohio law, all sunk costs of canceled investment were extraordinary
losses and not recoverable. Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that the Ohio Supreme
Published by eGrove, 2012
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be used by the rate paying public, and will it be useful to them.
If used and useful, the utility is allowed to recover its invest
ment; if not used and useful, the utility is not allowed to recover
that investment.18
Notwithstanding prudence in the decision to invest, Priest
[1966, p. 307, italics added] notes that “[l]oss of value arising
out of deflation, or obsolescence, or changed economic condi
tions, will inevitably be recognized for the purpose of making
utility rates.” For example, in the Market Street Railway case,19
the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of the California
Railroad Commission to set the rate base of a San Francisco
street railway company at $7,950,000—the price that company
offered the property for sale to the city—although its book
value was $41,768,505 and its estimated reproduction cost was
$25,000,000, and noted the following:
... it may be safely generalized that the due process
clause never has been held by this Court to require a
commission to fix rates on the present reproduction
value of something no one would presently want to
reproduce, or on the historical valuation of a property
whose history and current financial statements showed
the value no longer to exist, or on an investment after it
Court reaffirmed its decision in three subsequent cases. See also Market Street
Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California ET AL. Nos. 510, 511, Supreme
Court of the United States, 324 U.S. 548; 65 S. Ct. 770; 89 L. Ed. 1171; 1945 U.S.
LEXIS 2625, February 26, 1945, Argued, March 26, 1945, Decided.
18Utility plant may satisfy the used and useful test without being currently in
use, sometimes without ever being in use. For example, Priest [1966, p. 310] notes
that a vintage electric generating plant that is less efficient than modem plants
will be included in the rate base if it is being maintained in condition as a standby
reserve and is being used from time to time. Such a plant will not be included in
the rate base, however, if it is not being properly maintained and has not produced
electricity over a lengthy period.
In other situations, utility plant may satisfy the used and useful test without
ever being in use. For example, Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17] note that many regula
tory bodies have used the used and useful test in allowing utilities to recover the
sunk costs of cancelled nuclear generating plants that, by definition, is never used
by the rate paying public. But they [1988, p. 17] also note that in applying the
prudent investment and used and useful tests, regulators usually examine three
decisions: (1) to begin construction; (2) to incur costs during construction; and (3)
to cancel the plant. According to Hearth et al.[1988, p. 17], regulators occasion
ally conclude that utilities waited too long before canceling plants and prohibit
recovery of sunk costs incurred beyond some earlier date.
19Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California ET AL.
Nos. 510, 511, Supreme Court of the United States, 324 U.S. 548; 65 S. Ct. 770; 89
L. Ed. 1171; 1945 U.S. LEXIS 2625, February 26, 1945, Argued, March 26, 1945,
Decided.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4
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has vanished, even if once prudently made, or to main
tain the credit of a concern whose securities already
are impaired. The due process clause has been applied to
prevent governmental destruction of existing economic
values. It has not and cannot be applied to insure values
or to restore values that have been lost by the operation of
economic forces.
Accordingly, under the prudent investment test and the used
and useful test , investment might be measured at some estimate
of fair value, aboriginal cost, or some adjusted historical cost.
RATIONALE OF ABORIGINAL COST FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES
Stickney et al. [2010, p. 835] define aboriginal cost in public
utility accounting as "... the acquisition cost of an asset incurred
by the first entity devoting that asset to public use.” They [2010,
p. 835] note that “[i]f regulators used a different cost basis,
public utilities could exchange assets among themselves at everincreasing prices in order to raise the rate base,” which would
be followed by raising the regulated prices based on that rate
base.20
Closely related to the concept of aboriginal cost and the
prudent investment test is using prudent investment theory to
measure the rate base. As expounded in his famous dissent
in the 1923 Southwestern Bell case, U.S. Supreme Court Jus
tice Louis Brandeis argued that what the investor devotes to
the public use (and for which s/he is entitled to a fair return
thereon) is not specific property, whose value fluctuates due to
changing prices but diminishes due to depreciation; rather, Jus
tice Brandeis favored using the objectively ascertainable amount
of invested capital to measure the rate base, usually measured
at aboriginal cost [see also Carpenter, 1950, pp. 374-75; and
Uroksky, 2009, pp. 611-614]. According to Brandeis’ prudent
investment theory, the investor is entitled to receive a return on
the amount of capital prudently invested in the utility enterprise,
and no more. Such a rate base would be definite, permanent,
and high enough to yield the investor an adequate return, with
out allowing the investor to reap profits on money s/he never
invested. However, as Carpenter [1950, p. 375] notes, despite the
20Bonbright [1945, p. 444] notes that "... despite all attempts to ridicule an
original-cost rate base by calling it ‘aboriginal cost,’ or other funny names, such
a rate base is required as a general rule by the logic of the prudent investment
principle.”
Published by eGrove, 2012
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cogency of Brandeis’ arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not sanction use of aboriginal cost or the prudent investment
theory to measure the rate base until the 1944 Hope Natural Gas
case.21
Bonbright [1945, p. 442] distinguishes the fair value stan
dard from the concept of aboriginal cost under the prudent
investment theory as follows:
The “fair value” standard undertakes to make the rate
base depend on the value of the utility property at the
time when the rates are being fixed, however much
this value may deviate either from original construc
tion cost or from actual cost to the present owner. The
“prudent investment” standard, on the other hand, uses
as its criterion not the value but rather the cost of the
property devoted to the public service so long as this
cost may be deemed to have been prudently incurred.
For public utility rate making purposes, the prudent invest
ment theory implies that a fair return is allowed only on prudent
investments in utility property. As Bonbright notes [1945, pp.
442-443, italics added], “[o]rdinarily, the relevant cost is the
cost of constructing the properties used and useful in the public
service, and this cost, save in a somewhat unusual case, means
the same thing as the cost of the property when first devoted to the
public service so long as this cost may be deemed to have been
prudently incurred.”
However, public utilities argue that whenever utility prop
erty has been transferred to another company at a price in
21 There have been many different ways of applying the prudent investment
theory. For example, Carpenter [1950, pp. 389-394] notes that during its first seven
years, the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission adopted the following differ
ent forms of prudent investment: (1) undepreciated original cost; (2) depreciated
original cost; (3) book cost less book reserve; and (4) invested capital.
Baur [1944, pp. 506-507] argues that prudent investment should be defined
as original cost less accumulated depreciation due to physical wear and decay
and to various functional causes such as obsolescence. He criticizes prudent in
vestment as original cost without deducting depreciation, as follows: “[O]nce a
corporate investment is made, it must subsequently be fully maintained or it will
be impaired or dissipated. Such full maintenance consists of ordinary repairs plus
proper provisions for depreciation as it accrues, both charged regularly to operat
ing expenses, which are in turn included in rates paid by consumers. If the total
original cost of plant were included in the rate base [without deducting accumu
lated depreciation], the company would get a return not only on its own actual or
unimpaired investment, but also on the amount of consumer contribution pro
vided in the rates for the purpose of conserving the corporate investment [i.e.,
for the purpose of recovering a portion of the original cost equal to accumulated
depreciation].”
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excess of its original cost, this higher resale price is the new cost
that should be substituted for the original cost as the measure of
the rate base; utilities argue that the rate base should reflect this
new cost of the property to the present owner, not the original
owner. The fallacy of this argument, according to Bonbright
[1945, p. 443], is that consumers of public utility service would
be compensating investors not only for building plants devoted
to public service but also for buying plants from other persons
who have already built them and who have already been com
pensated for devoting them to public service:
Once these utility properties have been built and have
been put into public service, investors who buy them
later from their original owners are simply taking over
these former owners’ claims to a return on the capital
devoted to the public service. We have here essentially
the same situation that applies when an investor buys
in the open market some shares of stock in a public
utility company. Such an investor may have bought this
stock at a very low price ... or at a very high price.... In
either case, moreover, the price that he paid may have
been a rational or reasonable price in the light of then
current expectations of earnings and dividends. Yet,
this investor could hardly adduce the high price that he
may have paid for his stock as an argument for public
utility rates designed to make the stock worth what
he paid for it. On the other hand, a group of consum
ers would hardly be allowed to establish the low price
which a stockholder paid for his stock in support of a
low rate base.
Bonbright [1945, pp. 445-46] notes that a step up of the rate
base of productive assets for rate making purposes may be justi
fied incident to combinations brought about by cash purchases:
In an ordinary cash purchase of a utility property from
former owners who have been able to exact a price in
excess of original cost, the new owner can make the
plausible argument that, unless he is granted a rate
base higher than that which would be accorded to the
very same property in the hands of the former owners,
his purchase would impose upon him a financial loss,
and this is a potent argument for recognition of the
excess acquisition adjustment cost [in the rate base]
wherever the purchase of the old property by the new
owner at a price in excess of what would be the old
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owner’s rate base was required in the public interest.22
However, Bonbright [1945, p. 446] argues that no step up
above aboriginal cost of productive assets for rate making pur
poses is justified for combinations brought about by exchanges
of shares.
... if the old owners of the properties, instead of selling
out, have merely pooled their separate interests [in a
stock-for-stock business combination], thus retaining
as a group the same assets that they had before the
consolidation, they are hardly in a position to urge that
they must receive an enhanced rate base because of the
price that they have been compelled to pay themselves
in order to induce themselves to consent to the merger.
Indeed, ... it would seem probable that the transactions
were of great benefit to the security holders even with
out reference to any claim for an enhanced rate base.
Bonbright [1945, pp. 445-446] elaborates that combinations
brought about by exchanges of stock rather than by cash pur
chases "... lacked the characteristic of an ordinary purchase and
sale whereby a new owner takes over the properties while the
old owner takes his cash and gets out.” To Bonbright [1945, p.
445, italics added], such combinations "... are mere pooling of
interests, in which each old stockholder surrenders his stock in
his separate company in exchange for stock in the enlarged new
company.”
Interestingly, perhaps the most prom inent advocate of ab
original cost of productive assets for rate making purposes was
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, first as Governor of New York State
between 1929 and 1933, then as President of the United States
between 1933 and 1945. According to Tobey [1997, p. 61], Roo22According to Bonbright [1945, p. 444], this is an exception where prudent
investment theory uses a valuation in excess of aboriginal cost for measuring the
rate base: “This exception applies to situations where a utility property has been
acquired by new owners as a necessary step in improving the public service, by
making a better, more efficient unit through the combination of existing utility
properties. In such a case, if the new owner was compelled to pay more than
original cost in order to accomplish this socially desirable objective, and if the
public benefit resulting from the acquisition of the property is more than enough
to offset the public burden of the higher rate base, the inclusion in the rate base
of the necessary purchase price seems to me to be in harmony with the ‘prudent
investment' principle’.”
On the other hand, Priest [1966, p. 319] notes that "... when utility property is
acquired at less than its original cost, the rate base is measured by the purchaser
price: "The theory is that it would not be ‘fair’ to impose an original-cost rate base
on consumers in such circumstances.”
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sevelt sought to further social modernization and enhance the
quality of life and living standards of the masses by reducing the
cost of residential electricity and thereby encouraging its more
widespread use by homeowners. At a time when perhaps only
20 percent of private homes in the United States were electri
fied and electric rates were substantially higher for homeowners
than for industry, Roosevelt reasoned that the more widespread
use of electricity in the home would further social moderniza
tion, reduce poverty, and lessen the drudgery of housekeeping.
In Roosevelt’s words,
[w]e all know that the great magic of electricity was
originally used for lighting purposes only. It then spread
to the factory for industrial uses. Now, however, the
time has come when electricity should be carried right
into our very homes so as to lighten the drudgery of
housekeeping. You and I know that scores of electrical
ly operated household appliances have been invented.
Of course, the housewives of the State cannot enjoy
these new inventions as long as the rates for [electric]
current continue to run as high as they now do.23
Tobey [1997, p. 95] notes that to Roosevelt, “[p]r ogressive
social modernization meant more than the material improve
ment of lives. It meant also the moral improvement of life, as a
m atter of social justice, through technology.” He [Tobey, 1997,
pp. 59-60] also notes that Roosevelt favored using aboriginal
cost [although he used the term cash cost rather than aboriginal
cost ] as a means of reducing the rate base and with it the rates
utilities charge residential consumers. As Tobey [1997, pp. 5960] notes,
Court cases established that the utilities could use “re
placement cost” as the basis for determining fair profits
and rates. This rule permitted the utilities to bloat their
capitalization, because the costs of electric plants in
the future would be higher (if only because of general
inflation). Roosevelt in turn pushed for statutory de
termination of “cash cost” [i.e., aboriginal cost] as the
basis for determining profit and rates. Profit ought to be
determined on the basis of the actual cash capitaliza
tion made by the companies in building their electrical
plants and distribution system. This, after all, was the
real debt being paid. Court permission to base profit on
23 Gubernatorial campaign address, Syracuse, New York, October 22, 1930, p.
20, as quoted by Tobey, 1997, p. 61, fn. 43.
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future replacement costs meant that companies could
calculate profit on fictitious sums they had not really
spent. Rates were correspondingly higher.
Thus, using aboriginal cost for measuring the rate base
was viewed by economic policy makers such as Roosevelt as a
means of fostering the social and economic policies of enhanc
ing living standards by reducing utility rates.
RATIONALE OF POOLING ACCOUNTING FOR REGULATORY
PURPOSES
Wyatt [1963, p. 22] notes that the term pooling of interests
was used initially to describe transactions involving combina
tions of closely related utility companies that sought to include
its assets in the rate base at fair value as of the combination
date. He [1963, p. 22] also notes that the FPC held that valua
tion at fair value was improper and that no new values should
attach to the properties since such combinations did not involve
a change in substance. For example, in the 1943 Montana Power
Company case,24 the FPC ruled that this combination of related
companies “.. was not a sale by which one party disposed of an
interest and another acquired that interest. Just as clearly actual
legitimate cost cannot be increased by a transaction which does
not result in parting with property.”
Shortly thereafter, according to Wyatt [1963, p. 22], the
term pooling of interests was used to describe combinations of
previously unrelated interests that were fused into one company
to be owned jointly—i.e., stock-for-stock combinations. In the
1943 Niagara Falls Power case involving such a combination,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the FPC order that the utility
should reduce the valuation of its properties to actual legitimate
costs (except for certain land); the court found that the utility
was not entitled to have its properties measured at fair value for
rate making purposes.25
Although the term pooling of interests was used initially to
24 In the matter of the Montana Power Company, United States Power Com
mission. Opinions and Decisions of the FPC, vol. 4, Oct. 1, 1943-Dec. 31, 1945, p.
235 , cited by Wyatt, 1963, p. 23.
25Niagara Falls Power Co. v. FPC, 320 U.S. 792; 64 S. Ct. 206; 88 L. Ed. 477; 1943
U.S. LEXIS 113 @ http://www.lexisnexis.com.remote.baruch.cuny.edu/hottopics/
lnacademic/?verb=sf&sfi=ACOONBGenSrch. However, it is the 1944 Natural Gas
Hope case that is most often cited as the precedent where the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly empowered the FPC and other regulatory authorities to use aboriginal
cost to measure the rate base. See supra, p. 8.
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describe a stock-for-stock combination transaction, not the ac
counting treatment of that transaction, Wyatt [1963, p. 23] notes
that the accounting treatment "... flowed from the manner in
which the Federal Power Commission viewed the transaction....”
The FPC favored aboriginal cost to measure the rate base—i.e.,
carrying forward the book values of utility assets of the constitu
ent companies of stock-for-stock business combinations. Clearly,
carrying forward book values of productive assets under pooling
of interests accounting is consistent with the concept of ab
original cost that was being used for rate making purposes. The
practice of using the same term pooling of interests to describe
the financial reporting for such stock-for-stock combinations
developed later.
American Institute of [Certified Public] Accountants Input: In
1945, the AI[CP]A’s Committee on Public Utility Accounting
[CPUA, 1945, p. 152] reported to the AI[CP]A Council that the
FPC has been suggesting the following three propositions in rate
cases:
(1) No new cost can be created by a reorganization that
does not result in a material change of individual
stock ownership.
(2) No new cost can result from a transaction that (a) is
at less than arm s length or (b) may be regarded as ef
fecting a pooling of interest.
(3) Where a change in stock ownership takes place with
out any change in corporate entity, a new cost can
be determined for all the property of the corporation
on the basis of the aggregate of the sums paid by the
new stockholders for their holdings; and, further, that
the cost of individual pieces of property may be deter
mined by allocation of the cost arrived at for the ag
gregate of all the property.
The CPUA noted that the Commissions propositions ap
parently conflict with the then current accounting standards of
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 24, “Accounting for Intangible
Assets” [ARB 24, 1944], Under ARB 24 [1944, para. 1], stockfor-stock combinations were reported at cost consistent with
purchase accounting, with cost “...determined either by the fair
value of the consideration given or the fair value of the consid
eration received, whichever was more clearly evident.” Addition
ally, under ARB 24 [1944, para. 5], the excess of cost over book
value was allocated to the tangible assets and preferably also to
intangible net identifiable assets of the acquiree whenever prac
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ticable to do so, with any residual excess recognized as good
will.26 Such an allocation of fair value results in reporting the
tangible and intangible assets of the acquiree at acquisition date
fair value for 100% acquisitions; and partly at fair value and
partly at book value for less-than-100% acquisitions, consistent
with the then prevailing parent company theory of consolidated
financial statements.27 However, the CPUA [1945, p. 151] noted
that it had not carefully studied the FPC’s propositions and
would not express an opinion on them.
The AI[CP]A’s Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP)—
the official U.S. accounting standard setter from 1939 to 1959—
took up the report of the CPUA. It initially concluded [CAP,
1946, pp. 441-442, italics added] that a pooling of interests,
which it defined as a combination of two or more interests of
comparable size, "... may represent another situation in which a
new basis of accountability is properly recognized and in which
assets are most significantly reflected in the accounting records
at monetary values most nearly representative of their fair value
at that time.”28 Presumably, this initial conclusion was favored
by utility companies that were pushing for higher fair value
valuations all along.
However, Wyatt [1963, p. 24] notes that this initial conclu
sion of the CAP—i.e., that fair values incident to a new basis of
26Under ARB 24 [1944, para. 3], limited life intangible assets were amortized
against earnings, as was limited life goodwill; indefinite life intangible assets and
goodwill was not amortized but, if impaired, were written down against earned
surplus (retained earnings), not capital surplus (additional paid-in capital). ARB
24 [1944, para. 6] discouraged but did not prohibit the prior practice of immedi
ate write off of goodwill against either capital surplus or earned surplus.
27Under the parent company theory, subsidiary identifiable net assets are re
ported at acquisition at book value adjusted for the parent company’s share of the
excess of fair value over book value. The parent company theory was prevailing
U.S. GAAP and IFRS until superseded by the economic unit theory by FASB State
ment No. 160, “Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial Statements”
[SFAS 160, 2007], in ASC Section 810, and by International Financial Account
ing Standard No. 22, “Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial State
ments” [IFRS 22, 2007]. Under the economic unit theory, subsidiary identifiable
net assets are reported at acquisition at fair value.
28Interestingly, the CAP [1945, p. 441] initially seemed to call for fresh start
accounting for stock for stock combinations of companies of comparable size,
whereby all the assets and liabilities of both companies are reported at fair value.
In an AICPA-sponsored research study that was intended to underlie a new pro
nouncement on accounting for business combinations by the APB, Wyatt [1963,
p. 82] also called for fresh start accounting for combinations of companies of
comparable size, which Wyatt called fair value pooling. However, the APB never
endorsed fresh start accounting, and the FASB (and the IASB) explicitly reject
fresh start accounting.
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accountability may be recognized incident to a stock-for-stock
pooling of interests combination of companies of comparable
size—was never officially adopted in its (or its successor APB’s)
pronouncements on generally accepted accounting principles.
Quite the contrary resulted. Starting with Accounting Research
Bulletin No. 40, “Business Combinations” [ARB 40, 1950, para.
5], the CAP called for pooling of interests combinations to be
accounted for by carrying forward historical cost book values
of net assets of the constituents, not by reporting any net as
sets at fair value. The CAP continued to prescribe this carrying
forward of book values for pooling of interests combinations in
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, “Restatement and Revision
of Accounting Research Bulletins” [ARB-43, 1953, ch. 7, sect. c,
para. 5], and in Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48, “Business
Combinations” [ARB 48, 1957, para. 9]. Essentially the same
accounting for pooling of interests combinations was also pre
scribed by the APB in Opinion No. 16, “Business Combinations”
[APB 16, 1970, paras. 50-51]; additionally, APB 16 [1970, para.
12 et passim] describes this carryforward of basis accounting
for the first time in the authoritative U.S. GAAP literature as the
pooling of interests method..29
Securities and Exchange Commission Input: At about the same
time, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
became a strong supporter of pooling accounting [see, e.g.,
Seligman, 1982, pp. 424-428]. Indeed, on occasion, the SEC
sometimes mandated pooling accounting for stock-for-stock
combinations that otherwise might have been subject to pur
chase accounting under then existing GAAP [see Barr, 1958, pp.
12-13]. The SEC's strong support for pooling accounting ema
nated from its aversion to most upward revaluations of plant
assets and higher depreciation charges based on such upward
revaluations, especially for rate making purposes.
Zeff [2007, p. 49] elaborates that “[f]rom its founding in
1934 until the early 1970s, the SEC and especially its Chief Ac
countant disapproved of most upward revaluations in property,
29 The various tests to qualify for pooling accounting changed as ARB 43 su
perseded ARB 40, as ARB 48 superseded ARB 43, and as APB 16 superseded ARB
48. In general, each pronouncement refined the tests but was followed by a relax
ation of the new tests in practice. See Sapienza, 1962, pp. 268-78; Seligman, 1982,
pp. 424-428; and Rayburn and Powers, 1991, pp. 160-188. Additionally, more and
more combinations were structured as exchanges of stock for stock to qualify
for pooling accounting notwithstanding premiums paid (in shares) to so qualify.
See Ayers et al., 2002, 6-7; and Lys and Vincent, 1995. Space limitations preclude
further consideration of these issues.
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plant and equipment as well as depreciation charges based on
such revaluations.” Zeff [2007, p. 50] credits Robert E. Healy,
one of the five founding SEC commissioners, as the person who
effectively cemented the SEC’s aversion to upward revaluations
of plant assets:
Healy was livid at the asset value write-ups that public
utilities had been booking.... He complained of ‘write
ups used to create income or to relieve the income ac
counts of important charges,’ which would be debited
to the revaluation reserve account that had been cred
ited with the write-ups.... He was driven to the conclu
sion that all upward departures from historical cost
were veritably heinous.
Healy also emphasized the importance of the stewardship
function of accounting. His views on the objectives of account
ing are aptly captured in his own words [Healy, 1938, p. 6]:
[T]he purpose of accounting is to account--n ot to pres
ent opinions of value.... The value of a corporation’s
property may be much or little--o r uncertain. Its cost
is usually certain. The capital entrusted to the manage
ment can usually be ascertained. What has been done
with that capital can be ascertained through account
ing. The steward must account for the talents entrusted
to him. Accounting to me means the making of a his
torical record of financial events. Valuation is a very dif
ferent matter.
In other words, Healy opposed utility plant asset revalu
ations [and was a strong advocated historical cost] at a time
when the SEC viewed the objectives of general purpose financial
statements to include stewardship and decision usefulness for
several user groups, including rate making by utility regulators-not just investment decisions by stockholders and creditors.
As Zeff [2007, p. 50] notes, given Healy’s influence over the
first four SECs chief accountants, his opposition to plant asset
revaluations and his advocacy of stewardship and historical cost
valuations led inevitably to SEC support for pooling accounting.
This position is consistent with the concept of aboriginal cost
and the stewardship objective of financial reporting.
Accordingly, pooling accounting evolved as the FPC (and
other regulatory authorities) started to use aboriginal cost and
prudent investment theory in determining utility rate bases once
they were permitted to do so as a result of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in the early 1940s. In the usual situation of rising price
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4

20

Nurnberg: Objectives of financial reporting, aboriginal cost, and pooling of interests accounting

Nurnberg, Pooling

65

levels, adherence to aboriginal cost under pooling accounting
resulted in reporting acquiree productive assets and measuring
utility rate bases at lower aboriginal cost book values rather
than at higher fair values. Ceteris paribus, lower rate bases
resulted in lower utility rates. In turn, lower rates encouraged
more widespread use of electricity, thereby reducing the drudg
ery of housework and enhancing living standards and economic
growth consistent with social and economic objectives of public
policy makers.
Of course, pooling accounting also became increasingly
popular by corporate management of unregulated companies
because it did not involve write ups of carrying values of inven
tories and limited life tangible and intangible assets that would
result in reporting higher expenses and lower earnings subse
quent to the combination date. Although pooling accounting
provided useful information for rate making decisions by utility
regulators and facilitated certain economic and social policies,
it was criticized for providing less useful if not misleading infor
mation for investment decisions by stockholders and creditors
because it understated post-combination operating expenses
and overstated post-combination earnings.
Subsequently, most of the accounting literature on pooling
accounting addressed issues applicable to unregulated compa
nies, not regulated ones; and much of the criticism of pooling
accounting dealt with its perceived defect of reporting produc
tive assets at historical cost book values rather than at fair
values for decision making by stockholders and creditors. Little
attention was given to other objectives of financial reporting,
including the benefits of reporting productive assets at historical
cost book values for rate making and stewardship purposes and
to facilitate social and economic policies. The next section of
this paper discusses the changing perceptions of the objectives
of financial reporting.
CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING
Presently, decision usefulness to stockholders and creditors
is viewed explicitly by accounting standard setters as the basic
objective of financial reporting; and neutrality is viewed as a de
sirable quality and an essential component of faithful representa
tion of accounting information. However, such was not the case
when pooling accounting was developed in the 1940s. Percep
tions about the objectives of financial reporting have changed
Published by eGrove, 2012

21

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 4

66

Accounting Historians Journal, December 2012

over the years, as have what constitute desirable qualities of use
ful accounting information.
Present Perceptions of Objectives: In developing financial ac
counting standards, including SFAS 141 (2001) which prohib
ited pooling accounting, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) relied in part on its conceptual framework. In
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, “Objectives
of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises” [SFAC-1, 1978,
paras. 34, 37)), the FASB concludes that the basic objective of
general purpose external financial reporting is to provide infor
mation that is useful for investment decisions by stockholders
and creditors. The FASB largely reconfirmed this basic objec
tive in its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8,
“Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Chapter 1, The
Objective of Financial Reporting” [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. OB2],
jointly developed with the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB).30
In SFAC-1 [1978, paras. 25-26], the FASB reasons that other
potential users of general purpose external financial reporting
information—such as suppliers, employees, customers, tax and
regulators, legislators, labor unions, trade associations, business
researchers, teachers and students—either have similar infor
mation needs as investors and creditors and/or have the power
to obtain whatever information they need. The FASB [1978,
para. 26] notes, for example, that although tax and regulatory
authorities often use information in general purpose financial
statements, both have statutory authority to require the specific
information they need to fulfill their functions and do not need
to rely on general purpose external financial reporting informa
tion. Similarly, when a financial institution negotiates with an
enterprise for a large loan or private placement of securities,
it can often obtain the desired information by making that
information a condition for completing the transaction. On
the other hand, individual stockholders and creditors cannot
require specific information if not provided in general purpose
financial statements. SFAC-8 [2010a, para. OB5] reasons simi
30 The emphases and conclusions of SFAC-1 differ somewhat from those of
SFAC-8, and the FASB relied on SFAC-1, not SFAC-8, when it developed SFAS
141 (2001). Additionally, SFAC-8 is more succinct than SFAC-1 in addressing the
information needs of regulators, public policy makers, and other users. For ex
ample, SFAC-8 discusses the information needs of regulators for maintaining fi
nancial stability, not for utility rate making. A word search of SFAC-8 failed to find
a single reference to utility, utilities, regulated, or rate making.
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larly that "[m]any existing and potential investors, lenders, and
other creditors cannot require reporting entities to provide
information directly to them and must rely on general purpose
financial reports
As a result, SFAC-8 [2010a, para. OB5]
follows SFAC-1 and concludes that potential investors, lenders,
and other creditors "... are the primary users to whom general
purpose financial reports are directed.”31
Importantly, SFAC-1 (as reconfirmed by SFAC-8) was the
culmination of the FASB's extensive deliberations in the 1970s,
when individual and institutional stockholders and creditors
(and their advisors) were becoming increasingly prominent if
not the dominant user group among FASB constituents.32 Pool
ing accounting evolved long before the FASB developed its con
ceptual framework.
It is true that regulators may have the statutory authority to
require specific information they need to fulfill their functions
and do not need to rely on external financial reporting informa
tion. However, regulators often choose not to exercise such au
thority, and to rely on information in general purpose financial
statements instead. For example, Quint [1994, p. 27] notes that
utility regulators often insist on making decisions based on in
formation in general purpose financial statements.33 Similarly, in
31The FASB [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. BC1.23] also reasons that expanding the
objective of financial reporting to provide information to regulators would de
prive investors and creditors of information that they need; the only way to avoid
conflicts would be to eliminate or deemphasize the objective of providing infor
mation to investors and creditors. It [SFAC-8, 2010a, para. BC1.23] concludes that
"... eliminating that objective would be inconsistent with its basic mission, which
is to serve the information needs of participants in capital markets.”
32The predecessor to the FASB, the APB, which functioned between 1959
and 1973, briefly specified a similar decision usefulness objective of financial
accounting, again primarily for stockholders and creditors, but it also noted a
stewardship objective of financial accounting. In Concepts Statement No. 4, "Basic
Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business
Enterprises,” the APB [1970, para. 73, italics added] notes that the basic purpose
of financial accounting and financial statements "... is to provide quantitative in
formation about a business enterprise that is useful to statement users, particu
larly owners and creditors, in making economic decisions. This purpose includes
providing information that can be used in evaluating management’s effectiveness
in fulfilling its stewardship and other managerial responsibilities.” See also Most,
1977, pp. 107-120. The predecessor to the APB, the CAP, which functioned be
tween 1939 and 1959 when pooling accounting was developed, did not explicitly
address the basic objectives of financial accounting in a comparable manner.
33Quint [1994, p. 27] notes that in the Entergy Services case, the FERC per
mitted purchase accounting for regulatory purposes notwithstanding its prefer
ence for pooling accounting in order to avoid "... the undesirable effects that may
result from potentially having different financial statements presented for regula
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assessing the adequacy of bank regulatory capital, U.S. federal
regulatory authorities insist on using the same mark-to-market
fair value accounting rules for loan portfolios that are used in
general purpose financial statements under current U.S. GAAP.34
Accordingly, it is somewhat simplistic (if not disingenuous) for
the FASB and IASB to dismiss the needs of regulators for finan
cial statement information.
Changing Perceptions of Objectives: Hendriksen [1970, p. 2] notes
that the objectives of financial reporting have changed over
time as one or more user groups have dominant influence over
financial accounting standard setters. He [1970, pp. 102-103]
notes that for many years [including the years in which pool
ing accounting was developed], another approach to standard
setting was to assume that the basic objective of general pur
pose financial reporting is to provide information for a set of
unknown users with multiple needs. At least before the FASB
issued SCAC-1 in 1978 if not now, many accountants and finan
cial report users concurred that the basic objective of financial
accounting is broader in scope than as enumerated in SFAC-1
and reconfirmed in SFAC-8—i.e., to serve multiple users, not
just stockholders and creditors.
tory and general financial purposes.” See also 64 FERC 61, 001, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, before Commissioners: Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chair;
Vicky A. Bailey, and Donald F. Santa, Jr., Entergy Services, Inc. v. and Gulf States
Utilities Company, Docket Nos. EC92-21-001, EC92-21-002, ER92-806-001and
ER92-806-002, Issued July 1, 1993.
34According to Berleau [2008, p. A15], the FASB's mark-to-market fair value
accounting rules are exacerbating the 2007 financial crisis: “Markets for individ
ual loans are still much thinner than for stocks and bonds. The market for securi
tized loans with unique features is even thinner, and a disruptive event can cause
these markets to virtually disappear. As a result, if a highly leveraged bank sells
a mortgage-backed security at a steep discount, this becomes the ‘market price’.”
Berleau [2008, p. A15] continues that “[a] single bank’s fire sale can decrease the
[total] ‘regulatory capital’ [of the banking industry under U.S. GAAP, whereup]
"... banks are forced to sell billions of dollars of assets to “clean up their balance
sheets .... creating a “downward spiral of prices, marking down —selling —mark
ing down again.” Representatives of the banking industry argue that the FASB’s
mark-to-market fair value accounting rules result in unrealistic writedowns on
loans that banks intend to hold to maturity, and should be replaced by other valu
ation rules, as least for measuring regulatory capital. See also Gorton, 2008, pp.
64-65; and Pinedo and Beck, 2008, pp. 6-8. However, federal regulatory authori
ties presumably maintain that using different methods is not politically expedient.
Given the 2007 financial crisis and the subsequent call for transparency in finan
cial reporting by banks, regulators presumably cannot mandate smaller loan loss
provisions for regulatory purposes than for GAAP purposes; and the FASB claims
that only the GAAP provisions are representationally faithful.
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For example, in a 1961 AICPA-sponsored research study
that was intended originally to underlie the development of
accounting standards by the then newly established APB, Uni
versity of California—Berkeley professor and AICPA Director of
Accounting Research Maurice Moonitz [1961, pp. 23-27, italics
added] argued that the basic objective of financial reporting
is decision usefulness for many different user groups, not just
for stockholders and creditors. Moonitz [1961, pp. 4-5, italics
added] notes that
... anyone who stresses “usefulness” as a criterion, in
accounting or elsewhere, must answer the two pointed
questions--u seful to whom? and for what purpose? And
herein lies the danger. We could easily be trapped into
defining accounting and formulating its postulates,
principles, and rules in terms of some special inter
est, such as the business community, or the regulatory
agencies, or investors, or tax collectors. But accounting
has been used in the affairs of private business, regu
lated and unregulated, of profit motivated enterprises
as well as nonprofit ones, of illegal as well as legal en
terprises, of socially undesirable as well as desirable
entities, of organizations in socialist, fascist, or commu
nist states as well as those in free enterprise societies.
We cannot proceed on the premise that accounting is the
monopoly of any one group, whether that group is con
cerned mainly with the development of the accounting
process or with its end-product in the form of financial
statements and reports.
Thus, Moonitz [1961] defined the objectives of general
purpose financial reporting more broadly than SFAC-1 [1978]
and SFAC-8 [2010a] to provide information needed not only for
investment and credit decisions by stockholders and creditors,
but for other purposes and other users, including rate making
by public utility regulators and fostering social and economic
policies by public policy makers.35
35 To some extent, of course, rate making by regulatory authorities and foster
ing social and economic policies are interrelated. For example, in setting rates,
Leventhal [1965, p. 1017] notes that some utility regulators consider the quality
of the utility service, which "... should include an awareness of the needs of the
public as they change and grow, conscientious effort to put technological research
and developments to the service of the community, and responsiveness to the
community’s plans and programs.” Additionally, Breyer and MacAvoy [1973, pp.
949-950] note that regulating utility rates might be motivated not only to curb mo
nopoly power but to redistribute income from producers to consumers. Interest
ingly, Breyer has been an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court since 1994.
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When Moonitz was developing his ideas in the 1940s, 1950s
and early 1960s, many practicing and academic accountants
concurred with this broader view of the objective of general pur
pose financial reporting including, no doubt, some of the mem
bers of the CAP under which pooling accounting evolved into
GAAP, as well as some members of the APB, and perhaps even
some of the early members of the FASB;36 many may still do.
Importantly, pooling accounting developed in part to satisfy the
information needs of utility regulators for rate making purposes
and public policy makers for fostering social and economic
policies in an era when many accountants, report users, and
standard setters viewed the basic objective of general purpose
financial reporting to include providing information for a set of
unknown users with multiple needs.
Stewardship as Another Objective: Additionally, prior to SFAC1 [1978] if not now, many Anglo-American accountants (and
perhaps even more non-Anglo-American accountants) viewed
stewardship (or accountability ) as well as decision usefulness
as important objectives of general purpose financial reporting.
For example, Oldroyd and Miller [2011, p. 11] note that besides
providing information that is useful for investment decisions by
stockholders and creditors, a basic objective of accounting is to
facilitate trade and investment by attesting to property rights
and obligations, so that property owners have evidence to en
force their rights in courts of law:
Stewardship fits into the equation through the ability of
accounts to communicate events at a distance.... In the
modern era, the separation of ownership from manage
ment is not the main reason for the creation of agency
relationships and accounts; rather, it is the need of
shareholders to evaluate operations at a distance.... De
cision usefulness, for its part, has existed as an adjunct
to stewardship accounting for most of its history.
SFAC-1 [1978, para. 50] notes that “[f]inancial reporting
should provide information about how management of an enter
On the other hand, some commentators criticized regulatory authorities for
using accounting requirements to foster social and economic goals. For example,
Brundage [1950, p. 388, italics added] notes that "... one of the most serious com
plaints of the accounting profession—that the regulatory commissions, on occa
sion, have used accounting requirements as a means for accomplishing social objec
tives, although in so doing they may have departed from what was considered the
best accounting practice at the time.”
36See, e.g., Paton and Littleton, 1940, pp. 2-3; and May, 1943, pp. 254-65.
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prise has discharged its stewardship responsibility to owners for
the use of enterprise resources entrusted to it.” It [1978, para.
50] notes that enterprise management
... is periodically accountable to the owners not only
for the custody and safekeeping of enterprise resources
but also for their efficient and profitable use and for
protecting them to the extent possible from unfavor
able economic impacts of factors in the economy such
as inflation or deflation and technological and social
changes.
SFAS-1 goes on to note that a central question for report
users is how an enterprise and its owners are faring, and that
the stewardship function of financial reporting helps answer
this question. In SFAC 1 [1978], however, the FASB downplays
stewardship relative to decision usefulness as a basic objective of
general purpose financial statements.37
SFAC-8 [2010, para. B1.27] notes more succinctly that
because decision usefulness is the basic objective of financial
reporting, there is no need for the conceptual framework to have
separate sections on decision usefulness for credit and invest
ment decisions versus decision usefulness for assessing manage
ment stewardship: “Both are important for making decisions
about providing resources to an entity, and information about
stewardship also is important for resource providers who have
the ability to vote on, or otherwise influence, management’s ac
tions.” In effect, SFAC-8 claims that stewardship is an aspect of
decision usefulness for investment decision making, despite the
widespread view heretofore that stewardship differs from deci
sion usefulness. Like SFAC 1 [1978] and prior APB pronounce
ments, therefore, SFAC-8 [2010] downplays stewardship relative
to decision usefulness as a basic objective of general purpose
financial statements.38 Moreover, to the extent that they consid
ered stewardship, the FASB (and the APB) consider stewardship
principally to stockholders and creditors, not to other interested
parties, such as regulators and public policy makers.
37The APB, the predecessor to the FASB, also downplays stewardship relative
to decision usefulness as a basic objective of general purpose financial statements,
as noted above.
38SFAC-8 [2010a, para. BC1.28] notes that the FASB decided not to use the
term stewardship in SFAC-8 "... because there would be difficulties in translating
it [stewardship] into other languages. Instead, the Board described what steward
ship encapsulates. Accordingly, the objective of financial reporting acknowledges
that users make resource allocation decisions as well as decisions as to whether
management has made efficient and effective use of the resources provided.”
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Interestingly, the European Financial Reporting Advi
sory Group [EFRAG, 2007], the [British] Accounting Standards
Board, and a number of other European accounting standardsetters argue that stewardship (or accountability) should be
viewed as a separate basic objective of financial reporting. The
EFRAG [2007, para. 3.1] elaborates that "... the stewardship
objective is about assessing managements competence and in
tegrity including the success of their strategy in managing the
business,” and that an assessment of stewardship "... was origi
nally the primary objective of financial reporting under agency
theory and is just as relevant today....” The EFRAG [2007, para.
7.1] notes that most [non-Anglo-American] respondents to their
survey view stewardship [to stockholders] as a separate basic
objective of financial reporting.39
Importantly, pooling accounting developed in an era when
many accountants and report users viewed stewardship as a
separate basic objective of financial reporting, if not the basic
objective; and where some commentators viewed stewardship
not just to stockholders and creditors but also to other interest
ed parties, such as regulatory authorities and public policy mak
ers. For example, Ladd [1963, p. ix] notes that "... accounting
has the vital social role of passing on to the public, information
about the extent and uses of corporate powers.” More recently,
Rasche and Esser [2006, p. 252] define accountability more
broadly as
... the readiness or preparedness of an organization
to give an explanation and a justification to relevant
stakeholders for its judgments, intentions, acts, and
omissions when appropriately called upon to do so....
Accountability thus entails a mechanism of effective
control by customers, citizens, and beneficiaries allow
ing an evaluation of the private or public good.
39EFRAG [2007, para. 5.2] notes that some respondents view stewardship
more broadly than accountability to also include the concept of responsibility,
that stewardship connotes that management should be striving to act in the best
interests of shareholders under current and future circumstances, whereas ac
countability connotes a backward looking and narrower concept than steward
ship. However, most respondents to the Exposure Draft to SFAC-8 treat steward
ship and accountability as interchangeable. EFRAG [2007, para. 5.2-5.5] favors
replacing stewardship with accountability because accountability is the true rea
son for producing financial reports - i.e., to provide an account to the owners.
Additionally, the term stewardship is old fashioned and for some only addresses
information on corporate governance issues; and accountability is more easily
translated to other languages than stewardship.
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Others [e.g., Briloff, 2002; and Briloff and Briloff, 2010]
concur that an important objective of financial reporting is to
hold the management of large publicly owned corporations ac
countable to society, especially when there is a separation of
ownership (i.e., stockholders) and control (i.e., management).40
Pooling accounting developed in part to enable utility m an
agement to demonstrate its stewardship over the aboriginal cost
of utility assets, not only to stockholders and creditors, but also
to utility regulators, the courts, and public policy makers that
were increasingly favoring aboriginal cost and prudent invest
ment theory for rate making purposes.
Economic Policy as Another Objective: Presently, both the FASB
and the IASB adhere to the quality of neutrality as an essential
component of faithful representation of accounting information.
For example, in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.
8, “Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Chapter
3, Qualitative Characteristics of Useful Financial Information”
[SFAC-8 [2010b, para. BC3.29], the FASB notes that in develop
ing financial accounting standards, it
... does not attempt to encourage or predict specific
actions of users. If financial information is biased in a
way that encourages users to take or avoid predeter
mined actions, that information is not neutral.
The FASB explains more fully in Concepts Statement No. 2,
“Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information” [SFAC2, 1980, paras. 98-100], that in developing accounting standards,
its primary concern is the relevance and reliability of the result
ing information, and that the resulting information should be
free from bias towards a predetermined result.
When it develops new accounting standards, the FASB dis
misses consideration of the effects of accounting standards on
particular parties or particular behavior, including national eco
nomic and social policy, notwithstanding its understanding that
accounting standards affect behavior. For example, in SFAC-8
[2010a, para. BC1.23], the FASB explicitly rejects suggestions
that maintaining financial stability in national capital markets
is a proper objective of financial reporting; it concludes that
40 However, Briloff [1967] and Briloff and Briloff, 2010] do not believe that
pooling accounting facilitates stewardship, at least to stockholders and creditors.
They are strong advocates of the purchase (or acquisition) method and strong
critics of the pooling method.
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such an objective would be inconsistent with its basic mission to
serve the information needs of capital market participants.
However, as early as 1940, various commentators note that
financial accounting information is the basis for significant deci
sions and policies in the economic, social, and political realm as
well as in business affairs. For example, Greer [1940, p. v, italics
added] notes that accounting is
... an important medium for the public expression of
the important facts about our vast and complex com
mercial and industrial society. Where the accountant
once was concerned merely with assisting the owners
of a business to evaluate its operations in money terms,
he now must recognize a broad social responsibility. His
findings, and the manner in which he sets them forth,
have become the basis for significant decisions and poli
cies, not only in business affairs, but in economic, social,
and political matters.....
Similarly, Paton and Littleton [1940, pp. 2-3, italics added]
note that
[g]reat corporations are quasi-public institutions for
social cooperation .... [T]hey have a duty to government
and to a price conscious public.... [T]he public aspects
of corporations call for recognition by corporate man
agement of public responsibilities; acceptance of such
responsibilities calls for the development and use of
corporate accounting standards.
One recent manifestation of the economic, social, and po
litical role of accounting is the Chinese Accounting Standards
Board (CASB), which opted to develop its own accounting
standard on business combinations, [Chinese] Accounting Stan
dards for Enterprises No. 20, "Business Combinations" [CAS-20,
2006], rather than adopt IFRS-3 (2004) verbatim. According
to Baker et al.[2010, pp. 112, 114], the capital markets orienta
tion of the IASB [and the FASB] largely ignores the existence of
mergers [of related companies]; under IFRS [and U.S. GAAP],
business combinations are viewed mainly as acquisitions result
ing from arm’s length bargaining between unrelated parties.41
In contrast, the political and economic focus of the Chinese
standards setters emphasizes the existence of both mergers of
related companies and acquisitions of unrelated companies; and
41 Almost as an aside, however, both the IASB [IFRS-3, paras. B1-B4] and the
FASB [SFAS 141(R), paras. D8-D13] note that combinations of companies under
common control remain subject to pooling accounting.
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the need to have different methods of accounting for these dif
ferent types of combination transactions. Baker et al.[2010, p.
112] contend that
Chinese standard setters sought to comply with IFRS
insofar as those standards do not adversely affect eco
nomic development.... [but] ... apparently concluded
that the IASB standard ... could have an adverse impact
upon the industrial reorganization process taking place
in China.
Consequently, Baker et al. [2010, p. 112] conclude that Chinese
standard setters view the fundamental objectives of financial
reporting somewhat differently than the IASB [and the FASB]
because they consider the effect of accounting standards on eco
nomic development.
Pooling accounting developed in the United States in part to
foster certain social and economic policies long before neutral
ity was ensconced by accounting standard setters as a desirable
qualitative characteristic of financial accounting information.
Some advocates of pooling accounting argue that by adhering
to aboriginal cost valuations of plant assets following stock-forstock combinations of utilities, pooling accounting results in
lower utility rate bases. In turn, the lower rate bases result in
lower utility rates, which encourages greater use of electricity,
enhances living standards, and fosters economic growth.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Through the years, pooling accounting was criticized as
contrary to the decision usefulness objective of financial report
ing and potentially misleading to stockholders and creditors
in making investment decisions. Critics of pooling accounting
argued that it does not provide decision useful information to
stockholders and creditors because it grossly understates (1) the
cost of stock-for-stock combinations; (2) the carrying values of
the net assets of the acquiree; and (3) the expense incident to us
ing acquiree net assets subsequent to the combination date.
From a historical perspective, however, there were some
very good reasons for requiring or at least permitting pooling
accounting for stock-for-stock business combinations when
the method was developed in the 1940s. At that time, the basic
objectives of financial accounting were viewed more broadly to
include stewardship and decision usefulness for multiple users,
including public utility regulators and public policy makers, not
just stockholders and creditors. Pooling accounting developed
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in part to satisfy the information needs of public utility regula
tors and public policy makers; it was a response to regulators'
increasing use of aboriginal cost to measure the utility rate base
for utility combinations, once they were permitted to do so as a
result of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early 1940s. Lower
utility rates resulted when utility rate bases were measured at
aboriginal costs under pooling accounting rather than at fair
values under purchase accounting. In turn, lower utility rates
facilitated the attainment of certain social and economic goals;
it encouraged more widespread use of electricity, lessened the
drudgery of housework, and enhanced living standards and eco
nomic growth.
ADDENDUM
Recent Combinations of Health Care Organizations

Mathews (2012a) reports rising medical prices associated
with increasing numbers of hospital systems combining with
private physician practices. Although hospital representatives
contend that the combinations make health care more efficient,
rising prices result because insurance companies pay for medi
cal services at hospital systems rates that are a lot higher than
the rates for the same services performed at private medical
practice facilities. For some procedures, such as imaging scans,
insurance companies reimburse as hospital outpatient proce
dures rather than as practice office procedures. According to
Mathews (2012a), the same procedure, sometimes performed at
the same location, may double in price once a hospital system
acquires the medical practice. Mathews (2012b) also reports
that several states attorney-generals are investigating whether
mergers of hospitals and doctor groups are pushing up prices.
Of course, this increase in third-party reimbursement rates
is due to many other factors. According to Mathews (2012b), the
primary factor may be the increased bargaining power of medi
cal service providers due to the reduced competition by combin
ing previously competing hospitals and private physician prac
tices. Additionally—and unmentioned by Mathews—the increase
in reimbursement rates may also be an artifact of the financial
accounting for these combinations. Third-party reimbursement
rates suppose to reimburse medical providers for the cost of
providing services, including depreciation of medical facilities
and equipment; and depreciation increases due to the increase
in the depreciation base by using +purchase (or acquisition)
method to record these combinations when fair value exceeds
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/4

32

Nurnberg: Objectives of financial reporting, aboriginal cost, and pooling of interests accounting

Nurnberg, Pooling

77

aboriginal cost of these facilities and equipment. To that extent,
third-party providers may push for aboriginal cost valuations
of acquired facilities and equipment under the pooling method,
at least for third-party reimbursement rate making purposes.
To date, however, this accounting artifact issue has not been
reported to be under active consideration by either third-party
providers or states attorneys-general.
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